872bf80a13580a12b1e47a535d63d7de1f2f8e0d
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Vasyka
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47eb4f62c1 |
feat(injector-protocols): full module — resource + PDF export via Browsershot
Implements the injector diagnostic protocol module per spec:
- Migration: injector_protocols + injector_protocol_rows with company_id
(multi-tenant), vehicle_id (not car_id — this CRM uses Vehicle),
master_id FK to users, snapshot fields (car_model/plate/vin/mileage/year/
injector_brand) captured at protocol time.
- Models with BelongsToTenant; auto-generate protocol_number as
PS-{tenantId}-{year}-{seq6}; auto-seed 8 empty rows on create.
- Permissions: injector_protocols.view + injector_protocols.conclude.
Default roles: owner/admin (both), manager (both), receptionist (view
only), mechanic (both). Test permission count updated 52→54.
- InjectorProtocolResource under Service nav group with 4 sections:
data auto+client (with client_id/vehicle_id lookups auto-filling
snapshot fields), reason checkboxes, 8-row repeater for measurements
(Repeater with position hidden; fixed 8, non-addable/deletable),
conclusion + comment + master signature.
- Table with columns, badge filters, PDF action.
- Blade PDF template: pixel-close to reference (graphite/gold/blue
brand tokens, striped rows, rotated 'ФОРСУНКИ' header).
- Route /app/injector-protocols/{id}/pdf with permission gate,
streams PDF via new InjectorProtocolPdfService (Browsershot).
- Dockerfile: install nodejs 22 + chromium + noto fonts + puppeteer-core
in /opt/browsershot; env vars for Browsershot binary paths.
- +71 RU/EN translations covering resource + PDF template.
All 306 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Vasyka
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70ca2fa74a |
feat: marjă internă per mechanic — hidden margin on labor
Client sees only Total. Salary is calculated from salary_base = client_price
× (1 − margin/100). Margin never appears in customer-facing surfaces (PDF,
tracking JSON, portal).
Terminology: "marjă internă" — internal profit margin. NOT VAT/TVA. Never
called NDS/TVA anywhere in the code to avoid confusion with real Moldova
tax reporting (Doc 19/1C integration).
== Configuration ==
Fallback chain (in MarginResolver::resolve):
1. WorkOrder.override_margin_pct — per-Fișă for special contracts/VIP
2. User.internal_margin_pct — per-mechanic (main setting)
3. Company.settings.default_internal_margin_pct — tenant default
4. 0.0 — no margin
Example (mechanic Andrei with 20% margin):
User enters price_per_hour = 250 for 1h diagnosis
→ total = 250 (what client sees, goes into PDF)
→ salary_base = 250 × 0.80 = 200 (what mechanic gets salaried on)
→ applied_margin_pct = 20 (frozen)
If admin later changes Andrei's margin to 40%, the row's salary_base does
NOT change — history is immutable. Only new rows use the new margin.
Solves the retroactive-recompute problem for closed payroll periods.
== salary_base freeze semantics ==
wo_works gains 2 columns:
salary_base decimal(10,2) nullable
applied_margin_pct decimal(5,2) nullable
Frozen at save time by WorkOrderWork::saving hook. Recomputes only if
total OR master_id changes (i.e., someone actively edits the price or
reassigns the mechanic — in those cases we WANT the salary_base to
follow). Legacy rows (before this feature) have null salary_base;
PayrollCalculator falls back to total for them.
== PayrollCalculator uses salary_base ==
Previously: sum(wo_works.total) × works_pct → gave the mechanic a cut
of the price INCLUDING margin.
Now: sum(salary_base ?? total) × works_pct → the cut is from the
labor rate excluding margin.
Impact: for a 250 lei diagnosis at 20% margin with 50% payroll cut, the
mechanic gets 200 × 50% = 100 lei (was 250 × 50% = 125 lei). The shop
keeps the 50 lei margin regardless of the payroll %.
== RBAC gate ==
New permission FINANCE_VIEW_INTERNAL_MARGIN. Assigned to owner + admin +
manager + accountant in seed matrix. Not granted to mechanic,
receptionist, or viewer — those roles never see the "Bază salariu"
disclosure line or the margin % fields.
== UI surfaces ==
UserResource — new "Salariu & marjă" section (visible only with
FINANCE_VIEW_INTERNAL_MARGIN):
- Tarif orar (MDL)
- Marjă internă (%) with helper text explaining the -X% semantics
- Placeholder tells manager the exact formula
WorkOrderResource form — new override_margin_pct field in the "Plată &
total" section, gated by same permission. Helper text: "Doar pentru
cazuri speciale. Lasă gol pentru a folosi marja mecanicului."
WorksRelationManager (WO edit page) — Total column now shows a gray
subtitle line "Bază salariu: 200.00 MDL · marjă 20%" ONLY for users
with FINANCE_VIEW_INTERNAL_MARGIN. Everyone else sees just Total.
== Contract tests: NO leak ==
InternalMarginTest verifies with black-box grepping that:
- WorkOrderPdfService::generate output contains NONE of
{salary_base, internal_margin, applied_margin_pct, marja intern,
Bază salariu}
- /api/track/{token} JSON payload contains NONE of the same terms
- wo_parts table has no salary_base column (margin ONLY on labor)
- Changing mechanic.internal_margin_pct after work is saved does NOT
rewrite the historical salary_base (frozen)
- WO override wins over mechanic margin (contract-priced clients)
- Fallback chain: WO → mechanic → company default → 0
== Suite ==
298 passed (828 assertions). Was 285. +13 InternalMarginTest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Vasyka
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d9180e16b3 |
feat: P2 RBAC defers — REST API + invitation workflow
Closes the P2 items from /tmp/service/new/01-TZ-rbac §4.1 §4.2.
== User invitation workflow ==
New columns on users: invited_at, invited_by_id (FK self), accepted_at,
invitation_token (sha256 hash, indexed). Migration is idempotent.
User::sendInvitation($invitedBy = auth()->user())
- generates 64-char random token
- stores sha256(token) in invitation_token column (never plaintext)
- marks invited_at = now(), status = inactive
- queues UserInvitationMail to the user's email with the signed accept URL
- returns the raw token (for tests / API consumers)
User::findByInvitationToken($rawToken) hashes + lookups.
User::acceptInvitation($password) sets password (hashed cast), clears
invitation_token, marks accepted_at + email_verified_at, status = active.
Web routes (no auth — token IS the credential):
GET /invitations/{token} → password-set form
POST /invitations/{token} → validates min:8 + confirmed, accepts
Tokens expire after 7 days (checked against invited_at). Expired and
invalid tokens render dedicated views (invitations/expired.blade.php,
invitations/invalid.blade.php) instead of generic 404 — so the user
knows to ask for a resend.
UserInvitationMail uses Filament's existing markdown layout; subject
includes the tenant display_name.
== REST API ==
Twenty new endpoints under /api/v1/ (Sanctum auth + tenant scoping
via the existing EnsureTokenMatchesTenant middleware). All gated by
ADMIN_USERS_* / ADMIN_ROLES_MANAGE permissions; mechanic-level token
gets 403.
Users:
GET /users — paginated + role/status/q filters
GET /users/{u} — eager-loads roles + overrides + invitedBy
POST /users — creates inactive user + sends invitation
PATCH /users/{u} — update name/email/role/status
DELETE /users/{u} — soft delete
POST /users/{u}/activate
POST /users/{u}/deactivate — also revokes all sessions
POST /users/{u}/resend-invitation
POST /users/{u}/force-password-reset — re-sends invitation
GET /users/{u}/sessions — list active sessions (from sessions table)
DELETE /users/{u}/sessions — revoke all
DELETE /users/{u}/sessions/{sessionId} — revoke one
GET /users/{u}/roles — assigned roles
POST /users/{u}/roles — assign role
DELETE /users/{u}/roles/{role} — remove role
GET /users/{u}/permissions — effective: role perms + grants - active denies
POST /users/{u}/permission-overrides — add grant/deny (with optional expires_at)
DELETE /users/{u}/permission-overrides/{perm}
Roles:
apiResource roles — index/show/store/update/destroy
(system roles guarded against rename/delete)
GET /roles/{r}/permissions
PUT /roles/{r}/permissions — bulk sync
GET /permissions — catalog: flat list + grouped + labels + role labels
Authorization is uniform: every controller method calls $this->authorize()
which throws 403 if canDo(perm) is false. canDo() already honors the
overrides + admin bypass + audit log from earlier commits, so the API
behaves identically to the Filament UI.
== Tests ==
InvitationFlowTest (8): token generation + sha256 storage + queued mail,
findByInvitationToken happy/sad path, accept sets password + activates,
GET form renders, POST accepts + redirects, invalid token view,
backdated invited_at → expired view, password too short → validation error.
RbacApiTest (12): admin can list users, mechanic 403, create user
queues invitation, assign+remove role round-trip, effective permissions
endpoint subtracts active denies, add+remove override via API,
role index returns 7 system roles with permission counts (51 for owner),
role sync permissions, system role destroy rejected with 422,
permission catalog endpoint returns all 51 + grouped + labels,
revoke all sessions deletes only target user's rows.
Suite: 234 passed (659 assertions). Was 214.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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